Two decades of turnover data were collected for the national legislature of twenty-five industrialized countries. After a discussion of turnover's significance, we compare turnover rates across countries. A set of variables expected to influence turnover rates is described and multiple regression is used to test the hypotheses developed. Results show that frequency of elections, opportunity for double listings, electoral volatility and legislative institutionalization have statistically significant effects on turnover. In addition the type of electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional representation) is shown to have a statistically and substantively significant effect, with turnover much greater in the latter. Possible explanations for this effect are explored.
In the United States, the perception that low turnover has become a serious problem has led to a movement for mandatory term limits. The movement has had some success at the state level, if not on the national level. 13 According to supporters of this movement, legislators have grown increasingly distant from the public. Low rates of turnover have provided legislators with insulation from the public; the electoral connection, thought to influence legislators to act in the best interests of their constituents, is no longer sufficient to guard against abuse.
While most of the emphasis, both in democratic theory and in practical settings, has been on the need to assure sufficient turnover to guarantee that legislators are responsive to the citizenry, too much turnover is also problematic from a democratic theory perspective. This is especially true for popular sovereignty theories of democracy. These theories emphasize the centrality of the people's representatives in the creation of policy. If there is too much turnover, the institution with the closest ties to the people, the legislature, may be at a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis both the government and the bureaucracy.
Political parties in advanced industrial democracies, especially disciplined parties in parliamentary systems, have been considered by many scholars to be the major mechanism in the process of legislative turnover. Changes of legislative majorities and party changes in government maintain elite circulation, offer opportunities for aspirant groups and lead to changes in public policy. Hibbing even argues that parties, not the legislature as a whole, are the main progenitors of institutionalization.
14 But a 'parties' perspective on turnover begs the question of how much personnel change there is within legislative parties, irrespective of changes in legislative and executive composition. Intra-party turnover can also have significant consequences for these processes. 15 Extant data-based studies of legislative turnover are usually single-country. 16 Crossnational studies rarely examine more than two countries. 17 When they do, the discussion is often discursive rather than based on intense data analysis. 18 Somit et al. ' s more systematic study focuses on legislative incumbent electoral success in nine individual countries rather than on general, comparative patterns of turnover. 19 The major exception to a party-dominated perspective on legislative turnover has been 13 the United States, where parties are less powerful than in other democracies, the executive is independently elected, and individual legislators at both the congressional and state level have been able to maintain themselves in office through constituency service to groups and individuals. Even in parliamentary systems, constituency service has been increasing and may have some effect in insulating individual legislators against electoral tides. 20 In the United States, the historically growing advantages of incumbency and the consequent decrease in turnover have been well documented. 21 Aside from the role of constituency service, other reasons offered for variations in turnover in the United States include the number of significant parties competing, relative strength of parties, internal competition for nominations within parties, type of electoral system, reapportionment, economic upheavals, opportunities for career advancement -both within the legislature and in higher offices, and degree of legislative professionalism, especially pay. 22 Much of the literature on turnover in the United States, especially in Congress, has been more concerned with internal legislative factors affecting turnover than with external forces. 23 In political terms, decreasing turnover on both federal and state levels in the United States recently has led to the movement for term limits. No equivalent movement has arisen in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, even in those in which political elites have been criticized for being unresponsive, as in Canada, Italy and Japan. Two different sets of solutions have been tried in these countries. Along one path, both the public and scholars have viewed the problem as one of the wrong parties or politicians being in charge, to be corrected by voting against those parties. In both Canada in 1993 and Italy in 1994, this led to elections in which previously dominant parties (Progressive Conservatives in Canada, Christian Democrats in Italy) were decimated, new parties secured substantial footholds in parliament and overall legislative turnover was more than 60 per cent. In Japan, the results for the party system and turnover have not been as dramatic, because the movement for change has been led by dissident legislators from the formerly dominant Liberal Democratic Party. The other solution has been to restructure the electoral laws. In both Italy and Japan significant rewriting of the electoral laws has occurred in the past decade, at least partially in the hopes of making politicians more responsive.
In Canada, the only other country in which turnover of legislators has been a major topic of scholarly concern, the focus has been on the opposite condition of that in the United States, namely, what accounts for high turnover. Canada averaged more than 40 per cent turnover in the federal House of Commons in the twentieth century even before the 'meltdown' election of 1993, in which the decimation of the governing Conservative party led to 69 per cent turnover. 24 Provincial level turnover also has been high. 25 Among the hypotheses for the high turnover in Canada have been voter volatility, lack of an integrated provincial/federal political career structure, weakness of parliament as a legislative body, 'cipher' role of the individual backbench member of parliament, long distances between home constituencies and the federal capital, and inducements of generous retirement pay and appointments to positions in the Canadian Senate and Crown Corporations. 26 Nevertheless, no completely convincing, multivariate explanation of Canada's high turnover has been offered. Furthermore, the effects of high Canadian parliamentary turnover have gone largely unexplored, with two exceptions: (1) the resulting lack of experience even for many government ministers in Canada and (2) the favourable effects for the election of women candidates. 27 Despite studies of the long-standing contrasting cases of the United States and Canada and other examinations of dramatic party system disruptions leading to massive changes in a single election, there is surprisingly little comparative analysis of what constitutes 'normal' democratic turnover. Partly, this probably stems from over-reliance on Polsby's seminal article in which he employed turnover as a key dimension of what he called 'institutionalization' of legislatures. 28 Blondel's comparative study adopted this perspective, even to the extent of seeing reduced turnover for Canada in the 1950s and 1960s as part of a developing trend towards institutionalization. 29 Low turnover was to be expected for institutionalized, professionalized legislatures in advanced industrial democracies. At that point, cross-national analysis of turnover largely ceased, and the individual studies undertaken of the United States and Canada rarely put them into comparative perspective. 30 The one study that moves in the direction of considering turnover cross-nationally is by Somit et al. 31 This study incorporates some analysis of turnover in an examination of patterns, explanations and consequences of incumbency in nine advanced industrial democracies. The authors of the nine individual chapters, however, define turnover differently, making comparison across countries quite difficult. Somit is pessimistic about generalizing from these analyses: 'nor is there a single systemic feature which correlates consistently with either high or low incumbent success rates … Each national state is truly sui generis … a given political/electoral practice or process which works in one fashion in a given polity may be associated with quite different results in another.' 32 Such varied approaches and indeterminate conclusions indicate that it is essential to attempt to provide a consistent cross-national comparison of basic turnover rates and a coherent explanation of these turnover patterns across countries.
The major focus of this article is 'turnover', defined as the aggregate level of exit, from one general election to the next, of elected candidates in the popularly elected lower house of the legislature in a bicameral system or the sole chamber in a unicameral one. We proceed by first looking at turnover rates, then by discussing variables that are expected to affect turnover rates, and finally by presenting multivariate analyses to test these hypotheses and to build a model of turnover in advanced industrial democracies.
C O M P A R A T I V E T U R N O V E R R A T E S
Data were gathered on a number of variables for twenty-five advanced industrial democracies. 33 To measure turnover we collected data on winning candidates for all central-level lower house legislative elections from 1979 through 1994. This usually meant using an election from the mid to late 1970s as a base and using an election held in 1979, 1980 or 1981 as the first data point. 34 We did not attempt to measure turnover which occurred between general elections, either through by-elections or replacement of list candidates. Our measure of turnover looks only at the change from one general election to the next.
There are two possible ways of measuring turnover. The more common method is to examine the proportion of membership that changes from one election to the next. An alternative method, suggested by Hibbing, 35 is to normalize turnover on a yearly basis. Table 1 presents the data as average re-election rates per election and turnover per year. We test explanatory variables using turnover per election as the dependent variable with each election entered as an independent case.
Measured as turnover per election, the mean turnover for our sample of 116 elections in twenty-five countries, is 67.7 per cent of incumbents returning, or a 32.3 per cent turnover rate per election. The median country is Finland with a return rate of 65.0 per cent. When turnover is measured as average turnover per year, the mean is 9.56 per cent while the median country is Ireland with a turnover rate per year of 9.30 per cent. There is a strong, but far from perfect, relationship between the two lists, as the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient between the two lists is 0.71. The United States and the United Kingdom have low turnover using either measure, but there are countries where there is 32 Somit et al., The Victorious Incumbent, p. 14. 33 Arend Lijphart, in Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), identifies a group of thirty-six countries as having been continuously democratic from 1977 onward. We have collected data on twenty-five of these. The remaining eleven are all democracies in developing countries where we were unable to collect complete information. 34 While this pattern was generally followed there were a few exceptions. The 1994 Italian election was not included so as to avoid the inclusion of the electoral system change. Data for Germany covers a slightly earlier period to avoid having to deal with reunification. Finally, the French case is an unusual one in that the French switched election systems for one election (proportional representation was used in the 1986 election). Turnover for the French case includes only those elections where the majority vote, double ballot system was used for both the preceding and the present election (that is 1978, 1981, 1993 Average 67.7 9.56 a significant difference depending upon which measure is used. For example, Malta has the lowest level of turnover of all twenty-five countries when measured on a yearly basis (5.55 per cent), but it is only slightly above average when examining the proportion of incumbents who return from one election to the next (71.5 per cent). Ireland also presents an anomalous pattern, its incumbency return rate is one of the highest (76.1 per cent), but its yearly turnover rate (9.30 per cent) puts it at the median in terms of per year turnover. Another country which shows significant differences depending upon the measure used is Greece. When measured as turnover per year, Greece has the second highest level of turnover at 13.4 per cent per year, yet in turnover per election their rate of 64.4 per cent is just slightly below the mean. In all three of these cases what appears to be driving the results is the frequency of elections. In Malta there is a relatively long time period between elections (five years), but once elections are held substantial numbers of incumbents lose. In Ireland and Greece, by contrast, incumbents tend to be returned in any single election, but because they stand for election more frequently, they face a greater danger of being replaced. A number of interesting effects appear in the table. While the United States is at the very top of the list with respect to incumbency return rates, the United States does not have the lowest turnover rate on an annual basis. Malta, the United Kingdom and West Germany have noticeably lower turnover rates per year. Another result noticeable in the tables is that turnover rates are fairly high. Twenty of the twenty-five countries have average turnover greater than 25 per cent at each election. While that does not mean turnover is an irrelevant barrier for the circulation of new elites, neither is it the monolithic problem portrayed in some quarters.
T H E O R E T I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E S O N T U R N O V E R Turnover can be sorted into two basic types: involuntary exit and voluntary exit. As this study looks at the aggregate results from more than 30,000 individual decision points, it was impossible to categorize the exits for each legislator in terms of these two categories. We can nevertheless provide a general discussion of how different factors influence involuntary and voluntary exits, with special emphasis on variables that are likely to be important in explaining variations in turnover across countries.
Involuntary Exits
Involuntary exits occur when a candidate is (1) defeated at the ballot box, (2) fails to be renominated by her party when she desires renomination, (3) is forced to resign the seat, for example due to scandal, or (4) dies in office. While scandals produce headlines and can lead to the resignation of individual MPs, or even several MPs, they probably represent a very minor portion of overall turnover. Furthermore, we do not expect that scandals are more likely to occur systematically under one set of electoral institutions than under another.
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Dying in office is the ultimate form of involuntary exit; in terms of overall turnover, however, death is unlikely to be a major contributing factor, nor is it likely to follow any systematic pattern across the countries we consider. The limited existing information on death in office indicates it is not a significant contributor to turnover. In the United States, less than 1 per cent of House members have died in office during the last ten Congresses of the twentieth century. 37 Jackson's analysis of New Zealand turnover over nineteen general elections, 1935-90, finds 1 per cent of members per parliament die, with the numbers diminishing over time. 38 Our own analysis of individual MPs in Norway found that of 642 MP terms between 1981 and 1993, seven (1.1 per cent) terms were terminated by the death of an MP. We therefore concentrate on defeat at the ballot box and the failure to be renominated by the party as the primary methods of involuntary exits.
The most common form of involuntary exit overall is almost certainly electoral defeat. The likelihood of electoral defeat is affected by several factors, including structural characteristics of the electoral system. One obvious factor that is likely to affect turnover is how frequently an incumbent must stand for re-election. There is considerable 36 We tested for possible effects of scandal at the level of individual countries by using Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, see www.gwdg.de/ ϳ uwvw. We established a level of perceived corruption for each of the countries in our study by taking the TI Corruption Perception Index scores for 1980-85 and 1988-92 and averaging them. This index takes several existing indices and develops from them an overall index of corruption, with a heavy emphasis on public corruption. When we added this variable to the model, variations in perceived corruption across countries failed to have anything approaching a statistically significant effect on turnover rates. 37 Swain et al., 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998'. 38 Jackson, 'Stability and Renewal', p. 257.
variation in how often elections are held, depending both upon the official term of office, which varies from two to five years, and upon whether a vote of no-confidence can lead to the calling of early elections. Logically, the more often a legislator must stand for re-election, the more often there is a possibility the person may lose. A significant fear of most legislators is they will lose their seat through defeat by a candidate of an opposing party. We can measure the likelihood of losing due to a shift in public sentiment through measuring electoral volatility. In countries with greater electoral volatility, seats all over the country are at risk from one election to the next, and power regularly changes between major parties or coalitions. Single-country studies have consistently shown the greater the vote swing away from parties already in government or in parliament, the greater legislative turnover. 39 Conversely, where electoral volatility is quite modest, incumbents have less to fear from partisan defeat.
While vote swing is an intuitively obvious variable to consider, an important proviso must be added. The effect of vote swing on seat turnover varies across electoral systems. Vote swings have a more dramatic effect on the translation of votes into seats in majoritarian systems. This has its simplest form in the cube rule for translating seats to votes in single-member simple plurality elections.
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Taagepera examines the possibility of generalizing the cube rule 41 and Theil's extensions of the cube rule. 42 He finds the general formula for determining the power function n is (log V/log DM) 1/M , where V is the number of voters, D is the number of districts and M is district magnitude (DM is simply the number of seats in the parliament). The factor that has the greatest effect on values of n is the 1/M power to which (log V/log DM) is raised. Taagepera calculates the power function n for a large number of countries and elections, and finds that n runs from a low of 1.01 in a system of near perfect proportionality (Netherlands) to a power function of 2.93 for the United States, where district magnitude is 1.0. Based on Taagepera's findings, we expect an effect for electoral volatility, but one that depends upon district magnitude. Greater turnover due to vote swing should occur in systems with lower district magnitude, and lower turnover should be present in systems with higher district magnitude.
For most legislators electoral defeat comes via a competitor from another party, but it also is possible, under several of the existing electoral systems, to suffer electoral defeat at the hands of a member of one's own party. n (seats for party K divided by seats for parties L equals votes for party K divided by votes for parties L raised to the nth power). The magnitude of the effect of a change in votes on change in seats depends upon n, the power to which the vote formula is raised. The cube rule asserts that for single-member district systems this is 3.0, so that a 1 per cent shift in the national vote will lead to a 3 per cent shift in seats. For perfectly proportional systems the power function should be 1.0 denoting a 1 per cent shift in seats for that party.
candidate selection process, in most states open to all voters in a constituency, rather than limited to a party selectorate. This results in members of the US Congress being regularly challenged in party primaries. An incumbent is rarely defeated in a primary (for the 1980s and 1990s Swain et al. calculate that only 1 per cent of incumbents were defeated in primaries), 43 but possible defeat concerns legislators and affects their behaviour.
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Rates of intra-party electoral defeats are higher under various proportional representation (PR) systems. PR systems that use closed party lists (PR-CPL) afford candidates the greatest protection against intra-party electoral defeat, as voters cannot alter the ordering presented by the party. PR systems with preferential voting (PR-PV) vary in terms of exposing candidates to intra-party defeat. Some set thresholds so high that voters are in practice incapable of altering the ballot presented by the party (Norway, Netherlands, Sweden), others set the thresholds relatively high (Austria, Belgium), while others are designed to guarantee that voters will determine which of the party's candidates are elected to parliament (Finland, Greece, Luxembourg). Single Transferable Vote (STV) and Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) make the intra-party element of electoral competition even more visible. STV is a proportional system, used in both Ireland and Malta, where voters rank order all candidates on the ballot. Thus each candidate must compete, not only with those of other parties, but also with those from his or her own party. Gallagher found that intra-party defeats were especially important in Malta, which has extremely stable election results in terms of party voting and thus produces relatively little inter-party turnover. 45 Examining the fate of incumbents in elections from 1966 to 1998, Gallagher found that 72.1 per cent of legislators were re-elected, 7.4 per cent retired and 3.1 per cent were subject to inter-party defeat, but fully 17.4 per cent of representatives were victims of intra-party defeats. For Ireland, 1927-97, he found that 75.0 per cent of members of the Dáil were re-elected, 8.5 per cent retired, 10.7 per cent were subject to inter-party defeat, and 5.9 per cent were subject to intra-party defeat.
We expect electoral systems that expose sitting MPs to the threat of intra-party defeat will lead to higher levels of turnover. Katz examined the effect of intra-party voting in several countries. 46 He found that intra-party defeats due to preferential voting varied from a high of 17 per cent in Greece (with Finland also high at 14 per cent), to more modest levels in Italy (7.8 per cent) and Luxembourg (8.5 per cent). In general, preferential voting systems should increase turnover compared to systems where the party presents a ballot that voters may not disturb.
One form of protection that a sitting legislator can have against electoral loss is the possibility of running in two districts simultaneously. Chances for double listings are relatively common in mixed electoral systems such as in Germany. In the German case, more than 85 per cent of the winning candidates in the 1998 elections ran both as single-member district candidates and as part of the party list at the Länder level. Therefore, even when incumbents lose their single-member district seats, they stand a good chance of getting elected on the Länder list. Malta also has a tradition of double listing of candidates, although in the Maltese STV system this does not occur through national lists, but rather through individuals standing in two districts simultaneously.
While electoral defeat may be the primary form of involuntary turnover, deselection can also lead to an MP exiting involuntarily. Deselection, as we define it, is distinct from intra-party electoral defeat. It refers to a situation where a sitting legislator fails to be renominated by her party. Deselection appears to be a relatively rare phenomenon, the norm being that incumbents desiring to run for re-election are renominated. Of course, one of the reasons that deselection appears to be so rare may be that incumbents who face a serious danger of being deselected may opt for 'voluntary' retirement instead. While deselection by the party selectorate may be especially salient in systems that do not have a mechanism by which intra-party electoral defeat can occur, it is relevant for virtually all electoral systems and countries.
The probability of deselection can be expected to vary across electoral systems as the electoral system creates different incentives for the parties. To be deselected first requires the parties to have the formal power to deselect candidates. In the United States the parties have no direct power to deselect candidates. In every other country in our sample there are at least some possibilities for the party, either locally or centrally, to deselect candidates. To simplify dramatically, political parties have two primary incentives when considering whether to deselect an incumbent. On the one hand, parties need to have some turnover to encourage legislative aspirants at lower levels in the party organization to continue working for the party. On the other hand, the party must consider whether retaining a sitting incumbent improves the party's chances of retaining a seat. The ability of an incumbent to improve the party's chances of retaining a seat depends upon the degree to which he is able to attract votes based on personal appeal. This personal vote can be built on individual constituency case work, on the MP's visibility in the district, or ability to bring governmental services (pork) to the district. The greater the perceived size of this personal vote, the more reluctant parties will be to deselect incumbents.
While the idea of a personal vote is often seen as primarily an American phenomenon, tied to their candidate-centred campaigns, there is broad empirical evidence that a personal vote exists in several other countries. Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina provide evidence of a personal vote in Britain. 48 Their findings have been confirmed by several independent studies. 49 Ferejohn and Gaines provide similar evidence for a personal vote in elections to the Canadian House of Commons, 50 while Bean provides evidence of a personal vote effect in Australia. 51 While these effects are modest, they are regularly found. Perhaps more relevant than the ability of political scientists to demonstrate a consistent, if limited, personal vote effect, is the strong belief of the party officials making candidate choice decisions that there is a personal vote. As long as party gatekeepers believe there is a personal vote, this belief will affect their decisions.
When considering the likelihood of a perceived personal vote, we believe there is a clear distinction between proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems. From the perspective of the voter, the party is the paramount actor in proportional representation systems, while individual candidates will play a more significant role in a voter's choice in single-member district (SMD) systems. The incumbent has a greater incentive to do casework, bring home the pork, and make herself visible when she is the exclusive representative of a district rather than as part of a larger district delegation. She can safely engage in district work in the knowledge that she can exclusively claim credit for the work. Also, as the only MP from a constituency, the representative has a realistic chance of making herself known. There are, in other words, greater incentives for the MP to try and develop a personal vote in majoritarian than PR systems.
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When the party is to be represented by a single candidate in a local constituency, the strategic ramifications of that choice on votes necessarily concern the party. The more a system emphasizes a vote for an individual candidate, the greater the likelihood or perceived likelihood of a 'personal vote' being considered relevant, and the more likely parties will be reluctant to replace incumbents. It will be much easier for a party to rotate out members when they are nominating several candidates in a constituency and when voters do not identify with their local member of parliament. 53 Therefore we expect that turnover due to deselection will be lowest in SMD systems and greater in PR systems.
A personal vote will not only make parties more reluctant to deselect a candidate; it may also provide an MP with some protection when the national mood swings against her party. This should produce lower turnover than equivalent partisan swings in systems without a personal vote.
Another reason why a party might rotate candidates and therefore deselect an incumbent is that party ideology could place a heavy emphasis on the need to ensure their legislators do not grow distant from the people they are supposed to represent. Especially for leftist parties, elitism is sometimes depicted as a danger. There are several individual examples of this policy. The German Green party originally had mandatory rotation of the members of its parliamentary delegation, the Italian Communist Party replaced most of its legislators after two or three terms, and the British Labour party in the 1980s undertook 'mandatory 52 John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, in 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39, emphasize a different set of characteristics when they develop a ranking of incentives for individual politicians to cultivate a personal vote. We would largely agree with their rankings, with one important exception. They place single-member simple plurality (SMSP) systems where the party controls access to the ballot, i.e. the ability to run under the party's name (Canada and Britain for example), near the bottom of the list of systems where a candidate has an incentive to develop a personal vote, well below PR systems that allow for preferential voting. These differences we believe stem from a difference in emphasis. Carey and Shugart suggest when the party has control over ballot access, as they do in the British and Canadian cases, there is little incentive for the candidate to try and establish an independent personal vote. 'When leaders have maximum control over ballots, voters choose among parties rather than individual candidates, and so the value of personal reputations is minimized' (p. 421). We disagree; we believe personal reputations can affect the choices of individual voters under SMSP and therefore we expect a greater effect. These are cases where a personal vote would help both the individual candidate and his party, while Carey and Shugart emphasize cases where the individual candidate and party may have diverging incentives. It is worth noting the extensive literature cited above finds a personal voting effect precisely where Carey and Shugart say it is unlikely to exist. 53 Note also that the type of personal vote that Carey and Shugart suggest will be important in PR systems with preferential voting are likely to be used by MPs to try and distinguish themselves from other members of the same party. From a party perspective this type of personal vote is of little value. It may help the individual MP, but it is unlikely to help the party. Therefore, the party should feel less concern about rotating out sitting MPs in PR systems.
reselection' of sitting MPs. 54 Furthermore, parties of the left have been the leaders in implementing quotas and affirmative action programmes to include women and other minorities in greater proportions as legislative candidates in their parties and eventually as members of parliament. 55 Increased access for women and other minorities may require removal of sitting legislators; therefore it is reasonable to expect greater turnover in parliaments where members of leftist parties are more numerous.
Voluntary Exits
The decision to leave the legislature voluntarily is one in which the sitting member weighs the benefits and costs of running for re-election versus the benefits and costs of other career options. The decision is affected by the costs, economically and in terms of prestige, of leaving office and the possibilities for attaining a good position outside the institution. One variable affecting legislators' retirement decisions is pension benefits. Hall and Van Houweling found that retirement decisions by individual members of the US Congress were clearly affected by changes in the pension rules; several members delayed their exits to allow them to take advantage of more attractive benefits. 56 In the United Kingdom, there was a marked increase in retirement rates among elderly MPs after pensions were established. 57 Jackson notes there was an increase in voluntary retirements among elderly MPs in New Zealand after the approval of a Superannuation Act in 1947. 58 The American literature on turnover has considered explicitly the possibility of more attractive political positions outside the House of Representatives. This focus has noted that progressive ambition is an important source of voluntary exit from the US House.
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Members of the House leave to pursue higher political aspirations by running for the Senate, for a governorship, or perhaps even a major mayoralty. Others resign to take administrative positions in a new presidential administration. In the seven Congresses from 1979 to 1992, an average of 3.2 per cent of Members of Congress left the House each term to seek or accept other political positions. 60 While turnover generated by progressive ambition is a valid concept, it appears to be largely a US phenomenon. In most countries 54 57 We want to thank Michael Rush for pointing out the effects of pensions on retirements in the British House of Commons. While we tried to get retirement rule information for all twenty-five national legislatures we were ultimately unsuccessful and therefore are unable to include variables that might measure the effect of pension rules on voluntary retirements. It seems probable, however, these advanced industrialized democracies are all likely to provide pensions that are generous within the context of the society in which they operate. Even if we had the data, we do not believe differences in pension plans would explain very much of the difference in turnover rates. 58 Jackson, 'Stability and Renewal'. 59 Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics. the parliament is the pinnacle of political power and there are relatively few opportunities to move higher politically.
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There are likely to be differences, however, across legislators and legislatures in terms of their opportunities outside politics. Representatives in traditional conservative parties normally have more prestigious and financially rewarding professional opportunities outside the legislature. The opportunity cost of staying in politics is, in effect, greater for conservatives; therefore we expect that legislatures with larger percentages of conservative party members would have greater turnover.
In weighing the costs and benefits of staying in office, the degree to which serving in the legislature is attractive will depend on the amount of power wielded by the individual legislator and by the quality of work life within the legislature. These variables are directly affected by the level of institutionalization of the legislature. In his study of the institutionalization of Congress, Polsby argues that as working conditions became more regularized and policy influence became greater, 62 serving in Congress became more attractive, resulting in a reduction of turnover. Blondel posits that institutionalization is a function of the age of the legislature as a body, with younger legislatures not having established the conditions that make them sufficiently attractive as an effective place to conduct business. 63 We therefore predict that institutionalized legislatures are more likely to have lower turnover rates.
M E T H O D O L O G Y A N D V A R I A B L E C O N S T R U C T I O N
For the multivariate analysis we consider the rate of turnover for individual elections. The dependent variable is measured as the percentage of incumbents who are elected at one general election but fail to be re-elected at the next general election. This provides both a larger N (116 separate elections rather than twenty-five countries) and greater variance, thereby providing a more challenging test for the hypothesized relationships. Table 2 presents the variables and their predicted effects. Several of these deserve more extensive description before presenting our regressions. The primary distinction to test regarding electoral systems is the expected difference between majoritarian and proportional representation systems. When a party nominates a single individual, as in a majoritarian system, it will be less likely to deselect incumbents because of fear of the loss of what is perhaps a critical personal vote. In proportional representation systems the importance of a personal vote, for the party, is diminished, which makes parties less reluctant to replace incumbents. A reduced personal vote also would make it harder for incumbents to withstand a movement by voters against their party. Therefore we predict this variable to have a positive effect on involuntary exits (H1a, H1b). In distinguishing between electoral systems, we based our estimations on their description in the Inter-Parliamentary Union document Electoral Systems: A Worldwide Comparative Study.
64 61 The one obvious place where there is greater political power is as a minister in the Cabinet. In most cases, however, ministers continue to retain their seats in parliament or, at a minimum, their place on the party lists for elections if they do not retain their seats in the parliament. Virtually all ministers know they can go back to their old district and run again. In the United States, however, it is exceedingly rare for a minister to go back and run for his old congressional seat. While large numbers of ministers may be replaced by alternates in the parliament when the government is formed, we have counted ministers who are re-elected on their party's ballot as returning incumbents, even if they end up serving in the cabinet rather than the parliament. 62 Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives'. 63 Blondel, Comparative Legislatures. 64 Since half of the German MPs are elected via SMD systems, while half are closed party list system, West Germany has a value of 0.5. SNTV (Japan) and STV (Ireland and Malta) are defined as PR systems in accordance with Lijphart's divisions in Patterns of Democracy.
Secondarily, we expect electoral systems that expose candidates to the possibility of intra-party electoral defeats, through a ballot structure that allows voters to choose among different party candidates, to lead to increased turnover (H2). To test for the effect of preferential voting we include separate dummy variables for STV, SNTV and PR-PV (preferential vote) systems. All of these systems provide voters at the ballot box the opportunity to choose between several possible candidates in the same party. 65 This effect should be weaker, however, than the overall distinction between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Exits through intra-party electoral defeats in systems that allow intra-party voting is probably somewhat compensated by 'voluntary exits' through which parties remove MPs in those systems where there are no intra-party electoral defeats. Finally, we expect those electoral systems that allow double listing (West Germany and Malta) to have lower rates of turnover (H3).
Electoral Volatility (H4) is measured as the sum of all positive deviations in votes received by all parties from the previous election. The results are equivalent to the Pedersen Index, 66 which takes the sum of the absolute value of all negative and positive variations in votes received by all parties and divides them by two. This factor is then adjusted by the district magnitude power function to take account of the greater effect electoral volatility has in systems where district magnitude is low.
67
Earlier we indicated the more often a legislator must stand for re-election, the greater the danger of individual electoral defeat within a given period of time. When the dependent variable is turnover at each individual election, however, then the amount of time between elections, measured as the number of months since the last election, is expected to have a positive effect on turnover. The longer the time period since the last election, the greater the expected involuntary turnover in the current election because greater changes occur in the nature of the electorate over time (H5a). It is also likely that voluntary exits would increase. A member of the US House of Representatives in his early 60s is only making a two-year commitment if he decides to run, but a member of the British House of Commons is making a five-year commitment. This greater time allocation may lead some MPs to exit earlier (H5b).
The two party variables, leftist (H6) and traditional conservative party representatives (H7), were measured as the proportion of the legislative seats held by legislators from 65 There is some question as to which countries should be identified as having PR-preferential voting systems. We have chosen to identify the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden as PR-list systems, rather than preferential vote systems, because even though voters formally have the opportunity to influence the order in which candidates are elected, the barriers are so high that in practice voters are never able to change the order decided by the party. On the other side, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland are all cases where the voters clearly do influence outcomes through their voting. That leaves Austria and Belgium as cases where barriers for voter influence are quite high, but not insurmountable. We ran the regressions three ways. We report in the article the case where Austria and Belgium are both defined as preferential voting systems. Recoding this, first so that only Austria is a preferential voting system and then as neither of them are preferential voting systems, and then re-running the regressions, we found these possible changes did not affect the regressions in a noticeable way. Regardless of how Austria and Belgium are defined, the results are the same. Finally, note that starting in 1998 Sweden has changed the manner in which its preferential voting system functions, so that Sweden probably should be grouped with Austria and Belgium in future studies of preferential voting. 66 Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', European Journal of Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26. 67 To get the adjusted measure of electoral volatility, electoral volatility is multiplied by an estimate for n, the district magnitude power function (log V/log DM)
, where n is estimated as 3 1/M . Taagepera found for a very wide range of countries (log V/log DM) clustered around 3, setting log V/log DM equal to 3 is therefore a reasonable simplification.
parties of either the left or the right. To establish to which block a party belonged, we used the estimations of political scientists reported in Huber and Inglehart and in Laver and Hunt. 68 In addition, we used the estimations made by Wagschal, which include both expert estimations and policy estimates based on party manifestos. 69 From these three sources we identified all parties as falling into one of five groups: left, centre, traditional right, new right or others. To test the opportunity cost hypothesis, it is necessary to distinguish the traditional right from the 'new right' parties (examples of the latter are the Progress parties in Norway and Denmark and the Freedom Party in Austria). We expect the opportunity cost hypothesis to be most relevant for members of the traditional conservative parties, who have stronger ties to the business community.
Institutionalization of the legislature (H8) is measured as a simple dichotomous variable, legislatures are either established or 'new'. The latter category contains three countries: Spain, Portugal and Greece. In 1980 all three of these legislatures were less than seven years removed from a period of authoritarian rule. There was still considerable uncertainty in the political situation, including the stability and powers of the legislature. We expect to see greater turnover in these uninstitutionalized legislatures than in the more established ones included in the sample.
In the initial regression, dummies were included to control for individual country effects. Since there is the possibility that idiosyncratic factors in an individual country may affect turnover, failure to include country dummies could bias the other estimates. As it turns out, only two of the country dummies were significant, Canada and Portugal. We re-ran the regressions including only these two country dummies to increase our degrees of freedom; those results are presented below.
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R E S U L T S As Table 3 shows, most of our hypotheses are confirmed. We find turnover is well estimated by considering the electoral system, electoral volatility, the number of months since the last election, and whether the country is a new democracy. All of these predicted effects appear. However, the political leanings of the legislature as a whole do not appear to affect turnout rates. Neither the percentage of seats held by left parties, nor the percentage of seats held by traditional right parties affected turnover rates significantly.
One of the strongest effects appearing in the equation is the electoral system measure. Turnover, as expected, is shown to be significantly higher for proportional representation systems than for majoritarian systems. Proportional representation systems, as a class, have significantly higher turnover than majoritarian systems (H1). Oslo, 1996) . 70 While we did not suspect serial auto-correlation would be a serious problem in the dataset, just to be secure we tested for it in a couple of different manners. First, we included a lagged dependent variable in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The lagged term did not begin to approach significance (t ϭ 0.31, sig. ϭ 0.76). Secondly, we ran a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression using Stata (xtreg). All of the coefficients in the GLS regression showed up with the same effects and with the same levels of significance as in the OLS regression, only minor changes in the coefficient values occurred. As such, we merely report the OLS coefficients of our initial analysis. Our second prediction (H2) was that electoral systems exposing candidates to intra-party defeat have an added effect that should increase turnover; this hypothesis is largely disconfirmed. The difference in turnover between majoritarian systems and PR-closed party list systems is estimated simply by the PR system coefficient (b ϭ 9.85). Preferential vote system (PR-PV) effects are estimated as the combination of the PR systems effect (b ϭ 9.85) plus the preferential vote effect (b ϭ Ϫ 0.26) or 9.59. The non-significance of PR-PV indicates that turnover in preferential vote systems is not significantly different from PR-closed party list systems. SNTV system effects are estimated as 6.75 (PR system effect, b ϭ 9.85, plus the SNTV effect, b ϭ Ϫ 3.10).
71 STV system effects are estimated as 6.27 (PR systems effect (b ϭ 9.85) plus the STV effect (b ϭ Ϫ 3.58)). While coming closer to statistical significance, the coefficients again indicate that SNTV and STV are not distinguishable from PR-party list systems in terms of turnover.
Almost as striking as PR-PV, SNTV and STV being not statistically distinguishable from PR-party list is that the coefficients, non-significant though they are, are all negative. This indicates that turnover is lower in these systems, where there clearly is the danger of intra-party electoral defeat, than in the PR-party list systems where there is no fear of intra-party defeat at the ballot box. The logical conclusion is that sitting legislators face at least as great, and possibly greater, threats from party caucuses and party commissions 71 Since there is only one SNTV system, the coefficient imputed to SNTV is the equivalent of adding a Japan dummy to the equation. Since all the idiosyncrasies of Japanese turnover become defined as an SNTV effect, caution needs to be applied when interpreting the SNTV coefficient. Furthermore, since electoral reform in 1993, SNTV is no longer used in Japan. that tend to be the party gatekeepers in PR-party list systems than they do from a more open system. We suspect this is due at least partially to strategic considerations of personal vote effects. Such effects are virtually non-existent in closed party list systems, and therefore gatekeepers will feel less concern with failing to renominate incumbents.
As expected, double listing of candidates has a highly significant and negative effect on turnover (H3). The ability either to run both in a local constituency and on a regional list, as occurs in Germany, or to run in two constituencies simultaneously, as occurs in Malta, clearly provides incumbents with partial protection from involuntary exits.
Electoral volatility is important, as we expected (H4).
In further analysis, we tested to see if the adjusted formula for electoral volatility was superior to a simple measure of such volatility. It did perform better, but the improvement was small.
We find the greater the time between elections, the greater turnover will be once an election is held (H5). Each additional year between elections adds about 4.4 per cent to the turnover rate. In more extensive analysis, we found the best fitting functional form for the time variable remains linear. While it might have been expected that time's effect would be moderated as the number of months increased, neither a logarithmic format nor any other standard functional transformation of the time variable improved model fit.
The party ideology variables (H6 and H7) were not significant; neither leftists nor right-wing party dominance led to noticeable differences in turnover. It appears that neither concern about elite domination among leftists nor the opportunity costs among traditional conservative party members strongly affects overall turnover across all countries.
Having a less institutionalized parliament does have a noticeable effect, being a new democracy as opposed to an established one adds about six points to the county's turnover rate (H8). This effect appears even though Portugal's high turnover rates are controlled by the country dummy. Finally, the two other significant effects, the dummy variables for Canada and Portugal, show these two countries to be outliers, with substantially higher turnover than the rest of the sample, that cannot be explained by the variables in our model.
C O N C L U S I O N
Legislative turnover is a significant factor in the evaluation of accessibility of structures, recruitment of candidates, circulation of elites and policy change. In looking at turnover from a cross-national perspective, we find there is significant dispersion across the twenty-five advanced industrialized countries. Even at the low end, however, there is substantial turnover. Only the United States and Australia had 20 per cent or less turnover per election. Two-thirds of the sample had between 25 and 40 per cent turnover per election. When considering the cumulative effects of several elections by looking at the annual turnover figures, we find that 72 per cent of the countries (eighteen of twenty-five) have at least one-third new members in their legislatures within four years; an additional 16 per cent (four) would reach the one-third mark after five years. 72 Only Malta, the United 72 The United States falls into this category. There is a need, however, for some caution in considering the average yearly turnover figures we have calculated. This average probably slightly overestimates overall turnover. This is true because it may be the same seats switching over several elections while a large number may stay relatively stable. For example, assume that all incumbents run for re-election in the United States. If the election results in a forty-three seat swing to the Republicans in one election, followed by a twenty-two seat swing back to the Democrats in the next election, our manner of calculating turnover would estimate this as 15 per cent over four years or about 3.75 per cent per year. If, however, all of the seats that swung back to the Democrats in the Kingdom and Germany would be expected to take longer to renew one-third of their legislature. From our perspective these rates represent fairly significant turnover. There need be little fear that legislative bodies demonstrate so little turnover that the ability to respond to public demands is seriously hampered.
When we look at individual countries, there are several striking findings. First, from a comparative perspective, legislative turnover in the United States is low, but it is not uniquely low. It is not even at the top of the list when turnover is calculated as a per year average. The United States' low rate of turnover per election is relatively easily explained by the same factors that explain turnover in other countries. The United States has the shortest average time between elections, the electoral system is one that produces low turnover, and electoral volatility is relatively modest, comparatively speaking. 73 The data analysis showed the true outliers to be Portugal and Canada. The high turnover in Portugal may be related to a lack of legislative institutionalization; Portugal may be an extreme case of the 'new democracies' phenomenon. Portugal distinguishes itself from the other two 'new democracies' in that it has never previously had an elected national assembly; institutionalization may be especially problematic under these conditions. 74 Canada, by contrast, presents a genuinely puzzling phenomenon. The regression we presented includes several plausible explanations for high turnover, including the one most offered for Canada, electoral volatility. Despite this, the Canadian dummy coefficient remains highly significant. Canada deserves special study to determine why turnover rates there have been higher than in other countries.
This first systematic study of the patterns and explanations of comparative legislative turnover provides a picture of considerable regularity despite Somit's pessimistic assertion that factors explaining incumbency success vary from country to country. 75 We found consistent patterns; in advanced industrial democracies turnover is affected by external conditions, specifically voter volatility. It is also affected by a set of institutional variables stemming from the design of electoral institutions. These factors include the type of electoral system, the frequency of elections, the ability of candidates to be double listed and district magnitude -the latter affects how voter volatility translates into turnover. In designing electoral institutions constitutional experts might consider the effects of their choices upon legislative turnover, among other things.
There remains a substantial agenda for future research on comparative legislative turnover. Included should be basic descriptions and explanations incorporating more variables than was possible for this cross-national study. Mapping the frequency of involuntary and voluntary exits within individual countries would be a useful point of continuation. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that variables that fail to be significant for the full sample of countries may be of particular consequence in individual countries, or even within individual parties. In particular, while we failed to find an effect for party ideology, it is entirely possible that issues of elitism or opportunity costs are relevant in (F'note continued) second election were in districts they had lost in the first election, the number of seats where the occupant had changed over four years would only be 10 per cent or 2.5 per cent per year. 73 In further analysis we added a US country dummy to the regression reported in Table 3 . This term did not begin to approach statistical significance (b ϭ ϩ 0.44, s.e. ϭ 3.01). Thus we can quite safely assert the United States fits the general model rather than being a unique case in need of special explanation. 74 individual countries. Finding such effects would be significant in distinguishing between parties across countries. Beyond this, there are at least two critical theoretical points for understanding turnover that deserve more careful consideration. First, there is a need to look inside the very strong effect of the electoral system variable. The empirical evidence finds that overall turnover is greatest in proportional representation party list systems and proportional representation preference vote systems, with slightly lower levels of turnover in polities that use single transferable vote and single non-transferable vote systems, and with the lowest levels occurring in majoritarian systems. Turnover is dramatically lower in majoritarian systems than in proportional representation systems. We suggested turnover may be greater in proportional representation systems because party pressure to rotate positions would be greater in PR systems, and therefore deselection would be more common. In majoritarian systems the party has a strategic interest in retaining candidates because of their ability to generate a personal vote. Furthermore, the personal vote may help protect incumbents against partisan swings. Both of these effects are likely to be less relevant in PR systems.
In looking for alternative explanations for the gap between PR and majoritarian systems, greater electoral volatility in PR systems is not a plausible explanation. Bartolini and Mair report that for 1966-85 the mean electoral volatility in PR systems and majoritarian systems was almost equal (8.0 vs. 7.9). 76 Our results from approximately 1978 to 1994 show that electoral volatility is slightly greater, albeit the difference is non-significant, in PR systems (10.2 vs. 11.3 ). 77 Furthermore, as noted earlier, electoral volatility is expected to lead to greater turnover in majoritarian systems because of the power function effects. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the differences in turnover rates have their basis in involuntary exits caused by losses to candidates of other parties. Obviously, there is a need for greater work on this issue. Based on the results here, we suggest that in future work attention especially be paid to finding explanations for differences in deselection processes and voluntary exits across electoral systems.
The second outcome that deserves greater examination is the regression results showing that systems exposing candidates to the threat of intra-party electoral loss actually lower the turnover rate. At its simplest level, the results seem illogical. We know there is discernible intra-party turnover in the systems that provides the opportunity for it. How then can overall turnover be lower? We suggested it is because the parties are more hesitant to remove legislators who may have some personal vote, thereby depressing other types of turnover. It is also possible that 'voluntary exits' are substantially more common in PR-party list systems, and that many of these voluntary exits are in effect the parties strongly suggesting that the representative should consider a new line of work. Careful analysis at the level of the individual country is clearly needed.
There are also broader issues concerning turnover that deserve consideration. How turnover operates at different levels of the political system and with what consequences for other levels, i.e., variations of integration in career structures, need careful examination. Furthermore, does the level of turnover make any measurable difference in the performance of the polity? Is political instability more a cause or a consequence of high levels of legislative turnover? These and other questions are susceptible to empirical 76 analysis. The data gathering undoubtedly will be difficult, both within and across individual countries. It is high time, however, to take comparative legislative turnover seriously as a continuing, not a sporadic, topic in political science.
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